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- St. Mary's University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, May 2002. This comment is
dedicated to all individuals within the criminal justice system suffering from ADHD in
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effects of this disorder. I would like to thank my editors Norma Ortiz, Erica Benites, and
Christopher Tod St. John for their guidance in drafting and editing my comment. In
addition, I would especially like to thank my parents, Victor and Adela Garza, for their
love and encouragement and instilling in me that one person can make a difference.
Finally, I thank the ADHD students I worked with for allowing me the opportunity to
learn through their daily struggles the difficulties of this disorder.
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A PORTRAIT OF A.D.D.
Who is this child crying within me?
Which door is she hiding behind?
Where do I search for the missing key?
What locked, hidden secrets will I find?
Is she laughing?
Is she crying?
Is she good or is she bad?
Will I find her happily playing;
Or not knowing why she is so sad?
I dig deep for memories.
Only vague feelings surface.
To what do these fleeting burning
Thoughts in my heart allude?
Is this the beginning of a journey to my inner soul;
Or just an excuse for an insecure, lonely mood?
What am I looking for?! I impatiently shout;
An understanding to this confusion and doubt?
When will this restlessness in my heart cease?
Someday I will find contentment and peace!
Lord, lead me! I pray, My soul cries out!1
I. INTRODUCTION
First known to the scientific community in 1902, attention deficit hyper-
activity disorder (ADID), a physiological disorder, did not become a
1. Bev Price, Hear My Cry - Journeys into A.D.D. (identifying interactions between
individuals who have ADHD or have a relationship with an individual who has either been
diagnosed with ADHD or exhibits ADHD characteristics), at http://www.bevkprice.com/
(last visited Nov. 2, 2001).
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part of the public discourse until the late 1960s to 1970s.1 Throughout its
history, the disorder acquired different names? Prior to 1980, the disor-
der was called hyperactive child syndrome, hyperkinetic disorder of child-
hood, or minimal brain dysfunction.4 In 1980, the name changed to
attention deficit disorder (ADD), and in 1987 it took its final name of
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).5 Today, ADHD affects
approximately twelve to thirteen percent of the nation's school children,6
three to five percent of children around the world,7 and is considered one
of the most common psychiatric disorders among children.8
The historical names given to ADHD indicate it was once considered
only a childhood disorder. This belief changed as more adults began
to assert that ADHD led to problems within their workplace,9 their
homes, and contributed to higher divorce rates.10 With minors, how-
2. See GAm[iun. WEiSs & LILY TROKENBERG HEcsTmAN, HYPERAcnv- CHIL-
DREN GROWN Up: EMPcAL FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATnONs 4-7 (1986);
Susy Schultz, Helping the Hyperactive: Expert Says Illness Is Still Misunderstood, CH,.
SuN-TMEs, Nov. 10, 1996, at 60 (describing an interview with Dr. Russel A. Barclay, who
discusses the evolution of the disorder's name), available at 1996 WL 6772284.
3. See WEiss & HrHsA, supra note 2, at 4-7; Jeffrey Vishik, Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder and Criminal Responsibility: A Guide for Attorneys, 43(2) MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 83, 87-90 (1996). In 1902, George Still, a British pediatrician, was one of
the first to observe ADHD and concluded that the children were "overly defiant, emo-
tional, disinhibited and inattentive" due to injury or heredity. Wishik, supra, at 87. See
also Schultz, supra note 2.
4. See WEiss & HEcHTMAN, supra note 2, at 3-7; Schultz, supra note 2.
5. See WEISS & HEcHTMAN, supra note 2, at 4-7; Schultz, supra note 2.
6. See Tile Rise and Fall of ADD/ADHD: Hearing Before the House Educ and the
Workforce Comm. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, FED. NEws SERv., Sept. 29,
2000 (statement of Fred A. Baughman Jr.), available at http'./hveb.lexis-nexis.com/cong
comp/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
7. See Jim Chandler, Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), at http'J/vwwv.
klis.comlchandler/pamphlet/adhd/adhdpamphlethtm (last modified Nov. 2, 2001). This
pamphlet details the stages of ADHD, beginning with early elementary up to adulthood.
See id. It also provides information about causes of ADHD, the diagnoses of ADHD or
ADD, and prognosis of ADHD. See id. Medical interventions such as stimulants, and
non-medical interventions such as behavior modifications and social skills interventions are
also discussed. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Robert Herzog, ADD: Attention Deficit Disorder or an Arbitrator's Discipli-
nary Dilemma, 50 Disp. REsoL. J. 20, 22 (1998) (implying that although diagnosed with
ADHD as a child, these children can grow up to be working adults with ADHD).
10. See Frances J. Lexcen & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Psychopathology on Ado-
lescent Medical Decision-Making, 5 U. CHI. L ScH. ROUNDTABLE 63, 93 (1998); Lars
Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HAsm'os LJ. 241,
280-81 (1999).
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ever, the most troublesome manifestation of ADHD is juvenile delin-
quency. 1
In light of the recent recognition of ADID's behavioral effects on in-
dividuals, criminal defendants have begun to assert ADHD as a defense
using three different approaches:, 1) a mitigating factor asserting mental
nonresponsibility; 2) diminished capacity; and 3) the Fifth Amendment.12
Yet, the criminal justice system is not receptive to an ADHD defense,
and routinely dismisses the defense without evaluating expert testimony.
This comment addresses a crucial issue many judges are currently fac-
ing-whether or not to allow expert testimony, which is essential to an
ADHD defense. Four areas of the intersection of ADHD and the law
are examined to help resolve this issue. First, in the realm of education,
ADHD children are afforded legal protection under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act's (IDEA) definition of "other health impair-
ments." This comment contends that the advancement in education law
should be emulated within the penal system to prevent individuals from
being punished for having a disorder that is causally connected to the
crime they committed. Second, this comment suggests that if the defen-
dant's mental state is at issue, a thorough analysis of the defendant's com-
petence should be requested by either the defendant's attorney or the
court. Third, this comment argues that in spite of an increase in the num-
ber of children and adults diagnosed with ADHD or exhibiting character-
istics of ADHD, the criminal justice system does not provide guidance for
judges with regard to handling ADHD cases. This lack of guidance has
led to inconsistent treatment of ADHD defendants within the judicial
system. Fourth, this comment advances that expert testimony with regard
to a defendant's culpability should be admissible within the procedural
limitations set forth by the court in State v. Edmon.13 Ultimately, this
comment proposes that once the testimony of an expert witness is admis-
sible, the court should then consider the defendant's disorder when deter-
mining punishment.
11. See Heather A. Foley et al., The Relationship of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder and Conduct Disorder to Juvenile Delinquency: Legal Implications, 24 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PsYcaIATmY L. 333, 333 (1996). Foley states that approximately fifty-five percent
of all known crimes are committed by juveniles. See id. In 1989, a study conducted of
1,056 delinquents reported that fifty-five percent of the individuals had either ADD or
ADHD. See id. at 333-34.
12. See Wishik, supra note 3, at 85 (asserting that ADHD has been introduced as a
mitigating factor and as both a mental nonresponsibility and diminished capacity defense);
see also Foley et al., supra note 11, at 339.
13. 621 P.2d 1310, 1313-14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
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II. DIAGNOSIS OF ADHD
A. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Guidelines
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV)14
guides mental health professionals through the process of diagnosing an
individual with ADHD.'5 According to the DSM-IV, the criteria for an
ADHD diagnosis consists of evaluating three areas: inattention, impul-
sivity, and hyperactivity.' 6 There are three types of ADHD: (1) ADHD,
Combined Type; (2) ADHD, Predominantly Inattentive Type; and (3)
ADHD, Predominantly Hyperactive Impulsive Type.' 7
In classifying the type of hyperactivity disorder presented, the evalu-
ator refers to the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-IV.'8 The DSM-IV crite-
ria for inattention requires that the individual meet at least six of the nine
listed symptoms: lacks attention; makes careless mistakes; difficulty sus-
taining attention; seems not to listen; fails to complete tasks that require
sustained mental effort; difficulty organizing tasks; evades sustained at-
tention tasks; misplaces items; and forgets daily appointments.' 9 The
DSM-1V criteria requires that six or more of the following symptoms be
exhibited for hyperactivity-impulsivity: excessive running or climbing on
things; difficulty sitting still; extreme fidgeting; difficulty playing or par-
taking in leisure activities; always "on the go" or acting as if "driven by a
motor;" and talking excessively.20 For adolescents and adults, hyperactiv-
ity is substituted for feelings of restlessness and helplessness while "en-
gaging in quiet sedentary activity."2 For adolescents, the symptoms for
impulsivity are: frequently calling out answers in class; exhibiting impa-
tience; and difficulty awaiting their turn in games or group situations."
14. Am. PsYCHIATIc Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF ME-N.NrAL
DIsoRDRs (DSM-IV) (4th ed. 1994).
15. See id. The DSM-1V is a diagnostic tool used to assess psychiatric conditions. See
id. Individuals are classified based on the characteristics they exhibit. See id. While the
DSM-IV is a diagnostic manual followed by licensed professionals, counselors, therapists,
psychologists, and other professionals in the mental health field, an emphasis should be
included that these professionals are not licensed medical professionals and are therefore
unable to prescribe medications.
16. See iL at 78-79 (defining the diagnostic features associated with ADHD).
17. See id. at 78.
18. See id. at 83-85.
19. See id. at 83-84.
20. Id. at 78-79, 84.
21. Id. at 79, 84.
22. See id. at 84.
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B. American Academy of Pediatrics Guidelines
In May 2000, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) issued
guidelines for diagnosing AD-D.' According to Dr. James M. Perrin,
an associate professor of pediatrics at Harvard Medical School, the guide-
lines came in response to many requests by the practicing community for
the development of a more accurate and reliable method of diagnosis.24
The new guidelines require doctors to routinely evaluate children ages six
to twelve who exhibit signs associated with this disorder.' The guide-
lines also require the doctor's determination that the child display the
symptoms in at least two settings, such as the home and school.26 Finally,
to establish a correct diagnosis, the guidelines require that the symptoms
interfere with the individual's academic and social environment for at
least six months.27 Although implemented for a short period, these new
guidelines, in conjunction with the DSM-IV guidelines, should assist phy-
sicians in properly diagnosing ADHD.28
23. See Behavioral Pediatrics Child and Family Therapy Before the House Education
and Workforce Committee Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Family, Would
Tom Sawyer Have Been Prescribed Ritalin?, FED. NEws SERV., May 16, 2000 (Prepared
Testimony of Lawrence H. Diller), available at http:llweb.lexis-nexis.comtcongcomp (last
visited Oct. 9, 2001) (on file with author); Jane E. Allen, How Do You Know If It's Atten-
tion Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder?, L.A. TIMEs, May 8, 2000, at S3, available at 2000 WL
2238687.
24. See Allen, supra note 23 (noting that "[t]hese guidelines were developed by a
panel of medical and mental health experts with training in psychiatry, psychology, neurol-
ogy, epidemiology, pediatrics, family practice and child development, along with educa-
tors"). These guidelines are stringent in order to deter doctors from over-diagnosing or
under-diagnosing children with ADHD. See id.
25. See id. See generally Lexcen & Reppucci, supra note 10, at 93. Prior to the new
guidelines, patients were not always carefully monitored. See Lexcen & Repucci, supra, at
94. A study conducted by Sherman and Hertzig concluded that large portions of one-
month prescriptions for stimulants to treat ADHD were not renewed during a one-year
period. See id. This research led to the inference that physicians were inconsistent in their
approach for treating ADHD individuals. See id.
26. See Allen, supra note 23. Allen states:
Establishing a diagnosis for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder requires that par-
ents or other caregivers as well as teachers or school professionals provide direct evi-
dence of the major symptoms, as well as the age at which they began, their duration
and the degree to which the child's functioning is impaired.
Id.
27. See id. See also AM. PsYCHIATRc Ass'N, supra note 14, at 83-85 (requiring that
symptoms for ADHD be exhibited for a period of six months within two or more settings).
28. See Allen, supra note 23. In addition, the AAP will issue treatment guidelines that
"will offer options such as behavioral management, making changes in the child's environ-
ment and medications." Id.
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II. ADHD - THE CHILD
A. ADHD Among Children
ADHD is commonly discovered after a child begins attending school,
usually at the age of seven, and only after the child has exhibited ADHD-
related symptoms for at least a six-month period.2 9 However, some indi-
viduals are not diagnosed until after they have exhibited the characteris-
tics for many years.3 0 Some longitudinal studies indicate that children
who do not outgrow ADHD-related behavior may display symptoms into
adulthood."' ADHD has also been considered a disorder of inhibition
defined as a child's inability to censor or inhibit behavior commonly
under control by the child's peers.3 2 Although it manifests itself as an
attention problem in young children, ADHD also develops into behav-
ioral disinhibition among adolescents 3
B. ADHD as a Disability Within the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA)
In 1975, Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA) in order to allow educators to accurately address the needs
of a disabled child.' In Honig v. Doe,35 the Supreme Court described
29. See Rex. R. Schultze, Reading, Writing and Ritalin: The Responsibility of Public
School Districts to Adninister Medications to Students, 32 CREIGHrON L REV. 793, 795
(1999), quoting Victor W. Henderson, Stimulant Drug Treatment of the Attention Deficit
Disorder, 65 S. CAI. L. REv. 397, 397-98 (1991) (stating that school districts with drug
administration policies should consider medication within the student's individualized edu-
cation plan); see also AM. PsYcHiARic Ass'N, supra note 14, at 78, 80-85 (detailing the
criteria for ADHD).
30. See AM. PsycwA-xRc Ass'N, supra note 14, at 78. The DSM-IV states that clear
evidence of "interference with developmentally appropriate social, academic, or occupa-
tional functioning" must be shown for an appropriate diagnosis of ADHD. Id. Further,
such symptoms must be present in the patient before the age of seven. See id.
31. See Deborah W. Denno, Comment, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility:
Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 615, 644 (1988); Lexcen & Reppucci, supra
note 10, at 93.
32. See William Halikias, Understanding the Adolescent Offender: The Contributions
of Psychology to Juvenile Justice, 24 VT. BJ. & L Di. 22,23 (1998) (listing ADHD among
the recognized disabilities juvenile offenders possess).
33. See Allen, supra note 23. See also Halikias, supra note 32, at 23 (stating that ado-
lescent delinquents with ADHD experience the disorder as behavioral disinhibition).
34. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000); Philip T.K. Daniel, Discipline and the IDEA
Reauthorization: Tire Need to Resolve Inconsistencies, 142 ED. LAW REP-. 591, 591 (2000).
When Congress passed the IDEA in 1975, it was known as the Education for the Handi-
capped Act. Daniel, supra. It later took the name of Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act in 1990. See id. Due to many inconsistencies, there is a preconceived notion that
the new amendments to the IDEA will result in much litigation. See id. at 591.
35. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
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the IDEA as "a comprehensive system of procedural safeguards designed
to ensure parental participation in decisions concerning the education of
their disabled children and to provide administrative and judicial review
of any decisions with which those parents disagree."36 The IDEA, which
emphasizes special education and the unique needs of children, was im-
plemented to ensure that disabled children benefit from a free and appro-
priate education.37
The IDEA does not specifically list ADD or ADHD as a disabilityA8
However, its vague phrase "other health impairments," is interpreted to
provide protection for children with ADHD) 9 The Code of Federal Reg-
ulations (CFR) defines "other health impairments" as:
[h]aving limited strength, vitality or alertness, including a heightened
alertness to environmental stimuli, that results in limited alertness
with respect to the educational environment, that - (i) [i]s due to
chronic or acute health problems such as asthma, attention deficit
disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ... ; and (ii)
[a]dversely affects a child's educational performance.40
Implicit within this definition is the notion that ADHD is a disability
under the IDEA.4
The inclusion of ADHD under the IDEA as a protected disability is a
crucial development in education because it strengthens the advocates'
argument that obtaining an ADE-D diagnosis allows students to benefit
from IDEA services.42  Qualifying ADHD as a disability under the
36. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 308 (1988).
37. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (providing equal treatment
for special education children by preparing "them for employment and independent liv-
ing"); Bridget A. Flanagan & Chand J. Graff, Federal Mandate To Educate Disabled Stu-
dents Doesn't Cover Costs, 47 FED. LAWYER 22,23 (2000) (reiterating that the importance
of the IDEA is to provide disabled children with the right to an equal public education).
Children who were previously excluded from attending public school due to inaccessible
buildings and because of stereotypes were now afforded an equal education. See Flanagan
& Graff, supra, at 23. Approximately 6.2 million children from birth to 21-years of age
benefited from this Act between 1997 and 1998. See id.
38. See ARTHUR L. ROBIN, ADHD IN ADOLSCrENTs: DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT
153-56 (1998) (discussing the different legal means by which an ADHD child qualifies for
services); see also Paolo G. Annino, The New IDEA Regulations: The Next Step in Improv-
ing the Quality of Special Education, 23 MENT. & PHYS. Dis. L. REP. 439, 439 (1999).
39. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Annino, supra note 38, at
439.
40. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(9) (1999).
41. See S. Res. 1824, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted).
42. See SANDRA RiEF, THE ADD/ADHD CHECKLIST: AN EASY REFERENCE FOR
PARENTS & TEACHERS 228 (1998). See generally Annino, supra note 38 (discussing the
Department of Education's interpretation of the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA, which
includes ADHD as an example of "other health impairments").
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IDEA allows for the equal treatment and legal protection of children's
rights.43
Before an ADHID child can be disciplined within the educational sys-
tem, the school district must first determine if the cause of the behavior is
connected to the child's disability.44 If it is determined that the child's
disability is related to the child's behavior, then the student's individual
education plan (IEP) and the IDEA requirements would pertain to any
proposed change in the child's placement at school.4" If the child's be-
havior is not found to be related to the disability, however, then the child
is punished as a child without a disability.46 The possibilities of unjust or
unfair discipline for an ADHD child are alleviated by a prepared IEP,
which provides notice of the child's disability and recommends punish-
ment that coincides with the child's individual needs. 47
C. Trouble Within Schools-Drugs or Disruption?
An ADHD diagnosis carries a stigma.48 Many labels are attached to
an individual with ADHD throughout his or her life. The first label
which usually attaches before a child is diagnosed stems from a teacher's
43. See RiEF, supra note 42, at 226-27, 230-31.
44. See Terry Jean Seligmann, Not as Simple as ABC: Disciplining Children with Disa-
bilities Under the 1997 IDEA Amendments, 42 Aiuz. L REv. 77, 88-89 (2000) (stating the
child's disability should be considered when determining the proper punishment for a dis-
abled child).
45. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(C) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 34 C.F.R. § 300.523(c)
(1999). An IEP specifically provides the type of punishment or procedure that needs to be
followed when a child is disciplined. See Flanagan & Graff, supra note 37, at 25. Flanagan
and Graff state:
In 1975, Congress anticipated that IEPs would be only a few pages; however, the stat-
utory requirements now necessitate a sophisticated multi-page document that must
include, among other things: descriptions of how each pupil's disability affects his/her
involvement and progress in the general curriculum; measurable annual goals and
short-term objectives; the specific special education instructions; related services and
supplementary aids to be provided to the pupil; program modifications for school per-
sonnel; the anticipated frequency, location and duration of the services; and objective
criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules to determine whether the goals are
being achieved.
Id.
46. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 34 C.F.R. § 300.524(a)
(1999).
47. See RmF, supra note 42, at 226-31 (defining the advantages of identifying and
qualifying an ADHD child as disabled under IDEA and requiring the school district to
provide an education in the "least restrictive environment").
48. See Hearing Before die House Education and the Workforce Early Childhood,
Youth and Family Children and Ritalin, FED. NEws SERv., May 16, 2000 (statement of
Francisca Jorgensen, Special Educator Arlington County School System), available at http'/
/weblexis-nexis.comlcongcomp/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2001).
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aversion to having a "hyperactive child" in her classroom.49 After the
child is diagnosed with ADHD, the "learning disabled" label attaches.
50
Eventually, an individual with self-esteem and self-concept difficulties
may be labeled as a "loner.""1 Ultimately, ADHD affects a child's self-
esteem by creating feelings of vulnerability, inability, and inadequacy.52
Consequently, several studies show that "individuals with ADHD are as
much as seven times more likely than others to develop an antisocial per-
sonality or drug abuse problem in adulthood."53
In addition to emotional conflicts, the prescription of drugs for children
with a physiological disorder is oftentimes at the root of the ADHD con-
troversy.54 The symptoms associated with ADHD are curbed through
stimulants such as methylphenidate (Ritalin) or dextroamphetamine
(Dexedrine).55
Stimulant drugs, while temporarily diminishing the effects of ADHD,
can lead to addiction.56 In May 2000, a fourteen-year-old received five
49. See WEiss & HEI-IcrMAN, supra note 2, at 52. An evaluation conducted by teach-
ers rated children in questionnaires which tapped into "social maturity, academic perform-
ance, general attitudes and behavior and neuromuscular development. Children in the
worst 20% were called hyperactive." Id. See also Schultze, supra note 29, at 795.
50. See Schultze, supra note 29, at 795 (acknowledging that by stereotyping children
as learning disabled school personnel produce automatic reactions of special education
services and medications).
51. See WEiss & HEcIrrMAN, supra note 2, at, 43. A study "demonstrated that hyper-
active children as young as 6 and 8 years could be shown to have lower self-esteem than a
normal child." Id.
52. See RoBIN, supra note 38, at 51. In a 1995 study, sixty ADHD males and sixty
non-ADHD males in a control group were observed up to age eighteen and again at age
twenty-six. See id. "The ADHD individuals displayed lower self-esteem and psycho social
adjustments by adolescence and lower educational development and occupational status in
adulthood." Id. See also Richard Welke, Comment, Litigation Involving Ritalin and the
Hyperactive Child, 1990 DET. COLL. L. Rnv. 125, 141 (1990).
53. Sam Goldstein, Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder Implications for the Crin-
inal Justice System, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., June 1997, at 3, available at 1997 WL
10516545; see also WEiss & HECtMAN, supra note 2, at 85-87.
54. See ROBIN, supra note 38, at 225. But see STEVEN R. PLISZKA ET AL., ADID
wrrIH COMORBID DIsORDERs: CLINICAL AssESsMENT AND MANAGEMENT 42 (1999).
55. Henderson, supra note 29, at 406. The stimulant drugs "act to increase the effects
of norepinephrine or dopamine released at the axon terminal, primarily by blocking the
uptake of the neurotransmitter after it has been released." Chris Sinacola, Critic of Ritalin
Deplores Use of Labels and Drugs, TELEGRAM & GAZETrE (Worcester, MA), Nov. 3,
1996, at A21. Ritalin, a prescription drug, was approved by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration in 1957. See id. It is a mild central nervous system stimulant, which is considered a
controlled substance by the Drug Enforcement Administration. See id. Currently, two to
four million children are diagnosed with ADHD, and between 750,000 to 1.6 million chil-
dren take Ritalin. Id.
56. See Ritalin - The Fourth R in Schools: Discussing the Use of Psychotropic Drugs
for Youth: Hearing Before the House Education and the Workforce Committee Subcomm it-
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years probation for the attempted sale of Ritalin to fellow students5 7
The teenager, along with fourteen boys from his school, was implicated in
the illegal trading of Ritalin.5 s In his testimony, the student described
Ritalin as a "poor man's cocaine."5 9
Although the long-term side effects of stimulants on a child's develop-
ing brain are unknown,' many of the short-term effects are well docu-
mented.61 These consist of loss of appetite and weight, incoherent
babbling, paranoia, lethargy, irritability, weakness, uncontrollable
screaming, and hallucinations.62 Despite the criticism, clinical studies
continually show that "[s]timulant drug therapy is one of the most popu-
lar and effective methods of treating a hyperactive child."'
D. Residential Placement for Juveniles with ADHD Under the IDEA
A juvenile diagnosed with ADHD who receives services under the
IDEA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitative Act may qualify for residential
placement.64 The purpose of a residential placement is to afford students
tee on Early Childhood, Youth and Families, FED. Naws SERv., May 16,2000 (statement of
Terrance Woodworth Deputy Director Officer of Diversion Control Drug Enforcement
Administration United States Department of Justice), available at http'J/web.lexis-nexis.
com/congcomp/ (last visited Nov. 16,2001) [hereinafter Ritalin - The Fourth R in Schools].
57. See Rummana Hussain, Boy Given Probation in Ritalin Theft Try, Cm. TRIn., May
27, 2000, at 5, available at 2000 WL 3669503.
58. See id. See also Ritalin - The Fourth R in Schools, supra note 56. "From January
1990 to May 1995, methylphenidate ranked in the top ten most frequently reported con-
trolled drugs stolen from registrants. From January 1996 to December 1997, about 700,000
dosage units of methylphenidate were reported to our drug theft database." Ritalin - The
Fourth R in Schools, supra note 56.
59. Hussain, supra note 57, at 5; see also Ritalin - The Fourth R in Schools, supra note
56. Hussain notes that reports from numerous states and local municipalities indicate that
"adolescents are giving and selling their methylphenidate medication to friends and class-
mates who are frequently crushing the tablets and snorting the powder like cocaine." Id.
60. See James C. O'Leary, Note, An Analysis of the Legal Issues Surrounding the
Forced Use of Ritalin: Protecting a Child's Right to "Just Say No," 27 New ENG. L Rn-v.
1173, 1175 (1993).
61. See WEISS & HECTmrAN, supra note 2, at 46-47; O'Leary, supra note 60, at 1175
n.17.
62. See WEiss & HIcHrmAN, supra note 2, at 46-47; O'Leary, supra note 60, at 1174.
63. O'Leary, supra note 60, at 1175 n.17 quoting RUSSEL A. BARKLEY, HYPERACnVE
CHILD: A HANDBOOK FOR DIAGNOSIS AND TREATmiENT 89 (1981); DOROTHF.A M. Ross
& SHEILA A. Ross, HYPERACHvrry. CURRENT ISSUES, REsFIARcH & THEORY 182 (1982);
DANIEL J. SHAFER & RIcHARD P. ALLEN, HYPERACTIVE CHILDREN: DIAGNOsIs MAN-
AGEm-rNT 47 (1976); see also ROBIN, supra note 38, at 225-28, 234-41 (providing statistical
data that the amount of methylphendiate prescribed to children does not appear
excessive).
64. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1999). The CFR states: "if placement in a public or pri-
vate residential program is necessary to provide special education and related services to a
child with a disability, the program, including non-medical care and room and board, must
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with disabilities a free and appropriate education that will allow the stu-
dent to benefit educationally, while providing corrective measures for his
conduct.65 Rather than placing the offender in a juvenile detention
center, where the possibilities for recidivism are greater, residential place-
ment for juvenile offenders provides rehabilitative services for the of-
fender.66 In 1991, a study of 144 at-risk children "in a residential setting
or at risk of imminent residential care" revealed that thirty-seven percent
of the individuals had ADHD.67 It is evident by this study that more and
more juveniles with disabilities are involved with the judicial system and
attorneys need to be well informed of special education laws.
IV. ADHD - THE FORGOTTEN CHILD
A. ADHD Among Adults
While ADHD was once considered a childhood disorder, it has become
more prevalent among adults. In the last decade, more adults have been
diagnosed with ADHD than any other disorder, even though doctors
once assumed ADHD faded with maturity.6" According to Russell Bar-
kley, director of psychology and professor of psychiatry and neurology at
the University of Massachusetts Medical School, "[a] lot of people were
be at no cost to the parents of the child. Id. See also Flanagan & Graff, supra note 37, at
26 (stating that regardless of the parent's financial ability, parents are not obligated to
contribute financially to residential placement expenses).
65. See Ronald D. Wenkart, Juvenile Offenders, Residential Placement and Special Ed-
ucation, 144 W. EDUC. L. REP. 1, 2 (2000).
66. Compare Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995)
(noting that although the plaintiff did not qualify for residential placement because a con-
duct disorder does not allow for it, if it is a covered learning disability, then the school
district must provide a program for the child), with Wenkart, supra note 65 (stating that
although the residential placement is an option for juvenile delinquents receiving special
education services, this route should not be followed because it would deplete funds from
the program and deviate from the purpose, which is not to cure a mental illness or rehabili-
tate a juvenile offender). The cost of funding these programs for school districts ranges
from $50,000-$75,000 a year for each child. See Flanagan & Graff, supra note 37, at 26.
However, according to 0. Ivar Lovaas of the University of California at Los Angeles,
significant improvements in children have been reported. See id.
67. Jack Tichenor, Community Supervision of Juveniles, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 347, 352
(1998).
68. Compare Kristen L. Aggeler, Comment, Is ADHD a "Handy Excuse"? Remedy-
ing Judicial Bias Against ADHD, 68 UMKC L. REv. 459, 463-64 (2000) (stating that the
prescribed medications for ADHD have risen 500% in the last ten years and the disorder is
now being diagnosed in adults), with Bruce M. Familant, The Essential Functions of Being a
Lawyer with a Non-Visible Disability: On the Wings of a Kiwi Bird, 15 T.M. COOLEY L.
REv. 517, 530-31 (1998) (stating that since there are no tests which conclusively determine
if an individual has ADHD, an accurate diagnosis lies on an expert's experience).
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trained that people outgrew ADHD. We now know that's not true."69
He estimates that 15 to 20 percent of children may outgrow ADHD, but
65 to 75 percent will retain symptoms that could "impair them markedly
as adults."'7 Barkley also estimates that between two and five million
adults have ADiHD.71
B. Continual Drug Treatment for Adults
Dr. Paul H. Wender recently conducted a study of inmates with
ADHD and found that about twenty-four percent of male inmates have
ADD/ADHD.72 Once the study was completed, a program was imple-
mented to provide inmates with medication for ADHD and evaluate the
results.7 3 The researcher believed that "[i]f your ADHD is so disabling
that you have found yourself living in a remote walled prison of over
1,000 men, then it is unlikely that you will progress toward rehabilitation
without the aid of medication. '74 The study included a six-month to two-
year program which involved providing parolees with a thirty-day supply
of medication upon parole, participation in local support groups, and ac-
cess to counselors and physicians knowledgeable about their condition. 75
At the end of the program, the recidivism rate for those individuals who
completed the program was less than ten percent.76 While this study was
successful, it seems socially ineffective that these individuals had to be
convicted of a crime for a study in prison to address their ADHD diagno-
sis and treatment.77
It is important to note that not all individuals respond well to drug
therapy, and those taking medications should be carefully monitored.
Most recently in North Dakota, a twenty-six-year-old man, Ryan Ehlis,
69. Carolyn Susman, Knowing Syiptonis Key to Controlling Attention Deficit Disor-
der in Adults, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 28,2000, available at 2000 WVL 5371887.
70. Id See generally BuREAu OF JusncFn STAnsTcs, U.S. DIl"? OF JUsTcIE, 1.
PROVING THm NATION'S CRMINAL JusTIcE SySmi: FINDINGS AND RESULTS FROM STATE
AND LOCAL PROGRAM EVALUATIONS, available at http'J/%,vw.ncjrs.org/txtfilestl66822.txt
(last visited Sept. 16, 2001). 'The study found, among other things, that out of the 715
inmates randomly selected "[p]sychiatric diagnosis included 51 percent antisocial personal-
ity, 33 percent attention deficit disorder, and 17 percent depressionfdysthymia." Id. at 9.
71. Susman, supra note 69.
72. T. Dwaine McCallon, M.D., If He Outgrew It, What Is He Doing in My Prison?,
Focus (Nat'l Attention Deficit Disorder Ass'n, Highland Park, IL), Fall 1998 (stating that
roughly 600,000 inmates currently exhibit characteristics of ADHD or have been diag-
nosed with ADHD), available at http://vwv.add.org/Focus/prison.htm (last visited Nov. 8,
2001).
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See iL at 2.
77. See generally id. (discussing an ADHD study conducted on prisoners).
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was acquitted of the murder of his five-week-old child." Ehlis, who was
diagnosed with ADHD as a child, was attending college and having diffi-
culty with his studies.7 9 In an attempt to help Ehlis, the doctor prescribed
Adderall, a drug twice as potent as Ritalin. 0 Consequently, this drug
induced Ehlis into a temporary psychosis which caused him to murder his
daughter only ten days after taking Adderall.81 The case was dismissed
after prosecutors and psychiatrists determined that Adderall was respon-
sible for the tragedy.8 2 According to Ehlis' attorneys, Ehlis reported ex-
periencing delusions and hallucinations after taking the drug, 3 and
believed God was instructing him to send his baby to heaven. 4 The
judge agreed with the prosecutor's and psychiatrist's recommendation for
dismissal as long as Ehlis agreed to cease the use of any amphetamines. s5
The Ehlis case is not unique with regard to the connection between his
ADHD and the murder of his child. It is, however, an example of those
cases in which an inquiry into someone's potential for having ADHD is
essential. It is necessary, therefore, that all criminal defendants be prop-
erly evaluated before trial in order to determine whether any mitigating
circumstances apply.
V. PROTECTONS FOR ADULTS AND CHILDREN
DIAGNOSED wITH ADHD
A. ADHD as a Disability Within the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Rehabilitation Act
In contrast to the IDEA, which specifically addresses the educational
needs of disabled students, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)8 6
78. See Sarah Boseley, Family Sues Drug Firm over Baby Killing, GUARDIAN, Sept.
23, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27021150. At the time of the interview, Ehlis had plans to
sue the manufacturer of Adderall, a prescription drug used to curb the symptoms of
ADHD. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. While the doctor limited his prescription for a few days, thereafter Mr.
Ehlis followed his doctor's orders and doubled the dosage causing his temporary psychosis,
See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. According to the pleadings, Ehlis "felt 'wired,' his pupils were dilated and
his eyes were hurt by the light." Id.
84. See id.
85. See id. According to the makers of Adderall, the profile for the drug is extremely
good and only fourteen incidents of mild psychosis were reported out of ten million pre.
scriptions. Id.
86. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990 & Supp. 1994)
[hereinafter Americans with Disabilities Act].
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and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA)l are designed to help
individuals with disabilities in many areas of their daily life.' Title II of
the ADA states: "[No] qualified individual with a disability shall, by rea-
son of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied ben-
efits of the services, programs, or 'activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 9 By ADA standards, a
disability is defined as a "physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual."" Al-
though the definition includes the phrase "major life activities," Congress
has not determined what constitutes "major life activities," thereby mak-
ing interpretation of the statutory provision quite difficult.9 '
Individuals diagnosed with ADHD are also afforded protection under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which states:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability.., shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service. 2
87. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)).
88. Aggeler, supra note 68, at 467.
89. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. at § 12132 (1990 & Supp. 1994); see
generally Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-467,
H.R_ Rep. No. 101-544,1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1728 [hereinafter Education of the Hand-
icapped Act Amendments]. The committee which helped design the amendments stated
that its intent was:
to recognize the needs of persons with attention deficit disorder (ADD) by its addi-
tion to the list of handicapping conditions under the definition of "handicapped chit-
dren" designated in the Education of the Handicapped Act. Under the definition, it
has been placed within the category of other health impaired conditions
Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments, supra.
90. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A) (1990 & Supp. 1994);
see also Familant, supra note 68, at 525-26 (elaborating on the definition of mental impair-
ment and further concluding that an exhaustive list of the disorders is not provided).
91. See David W. Lannetti, Extending Coverage Act of the Americans with Disabilities
Act to Individuals with Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder A Demonstration of Inad-
equate Legislative Guidance, 35 TORT & INs. LJ. 155,160, 173 (1999). Lannetti stated that
"[d]espite the fact that ADID is not a learning disability-and that the legislative history
indicates that a conscious decision was made not to include ADHD as an ADA 'disabil-
ity'-several courts recently have held that ADHD constitutes such a disability." Id. (em-
phasis in original).
92. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994));
see also ROBIN, supra note 38, at 155 (exemplifying the various possible accommodations
under a Section 504 plan).
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Therefore, while ADHD individuals are provided for under federal disa-
bility acts,9 3 these same individuals are ignored within the criminal judi-
cial system.
VI. ADHD WITHIN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. The Link Between ADHD and Criminal Activity
One of the factors linking juveniles and crime is a learning disability,
such as ADHD.94 Even though ADHD children were once thought to
outgrow ADHD, evidence strongly supports the inference that a substan-
tial number of juveniles with disabilities, such as ADHD, are presently
involved, or are at risk of being involved in the judicial system. 5 An
attorney representing a client whose criminal actions were impulsive or
violent should inquire into the client's childhood problems, because many
adults are not aware that they have not outgrown ADHD, and some have
never been diagnosed. 96 A 1989 study conducted in New York State
compared the criminal history of 103 males diagnosed with ADHD to 100
males not diagnosed with ADHD.97 The research concluded "that signif-
icantly higher percentages of individuals with ADHD had been arrested
(39 percent vs. 20 percent), convicted of a crime (28:11), and incarcerated
(9:1). '' gs Because case law is inconsistent in deciding cases with an
ADHD defendant, it is uncertain how cases involving biological defenses
should be decided.99
93. See RIEF, supra note 42, at 226-35; Aggeler, supra note 68, at 460.
94. See WEiss & HEcIHTmAN, supra note 2, at 56-57; see also Welke, supra note 52, at
141. A 1982 study conducted in Los Angeles compared the socioeconomic status and crim-
inal activity in 110 ADHD adolescent boys to 88 adolescent boys who were not diagnosed
with ADHD. See WEiss & HECMAN, supra note 2, at 56-57. The findings consisted of
"[t]he percentage of hyperactive adolescents arrested at least once was 58% in the lower
class, 36% in the middle class, and 52% in the upper class, compared to 11%, 9%, and 2%
for the controls." Id. The offenses were classified as serious because minor offenses such
as "running away, getting drunk, petty thefts, and possession of less than I ounce of mari-
juana were excluded." Id.
95. See Symposium, Community Supervision of Juveniles, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 347,351-52
(1999).
96. See Wishik, supra note 3, at 90-91 (expressing that ADHD is not a new disorder,
and attorneys should inquire into the child's medical history to uncover information that
leads to an ADHD defense).
97. Goldstein, supra note 53, at 4. The researchers studied males ranging from ages
sixteen to twenty-three years. See id.
98. Id.
99. See Wishik, supra note 3, at 106-07; Denno, supra note 31, at 642, 667 (stating "no
case has established a firm standard for deciding when a particular mental state, short of
insanity, constitutes a defense against allegedly criminal behavior").
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B. ADHD and the Suppression of Evidence-Fifth Amendment
Implications
Impulsiveness may be a factor during the commission of the offense
and in the investigative stage of the crime for a defendant with ADHD.
Thus, it is imperative that a defense attorney raise this defense and evalu-
ate the different stages in which an ADHD defendant has not waived his
rights. An ADHD defendant, unlike other defendants, is unable to con-
trol his actions and behaviors. If an ADHD individual does not fully
comprehend his Fifth Amendment rights and Miranda warnings, then this
defendant may unintentionally waive these rights when interrogated by
police.1°° Because an ADHD defendant is unable to comprehend his
rights, he should not be compelled to give self-incriminating statements.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 10' the Supreme Court ruled that if the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination was violated,
a confession would be inadmissible. °2 For an admission to be valid, the
individual must first be read his Miranda rights and there can only be a
valid waiver of these rights during custodial interrogation. 0 3
Fifth Amendment protection is afforded to an accused during a custo-
dial interrogation, at sentencing, and at a sentencing hearing.1°4 In
United States v. Mitchell, 05 the Supreme Court differentiated between a
plea in open court and the privilege to waive the right to silence. 1° 6 The
100. See U.S. CONsr. amend. V. Amendment V states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger,
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence [sic] to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
101. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
102. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
103. See id. at 437. Miranda extended Fifth Amendment protections to include: 1)
the right to remain silent; 2) the right to speak to an attorney and have the attorney present
during interrogation; and 3) if an arrestee cannot afford an attorney, an attorney will be
appointed for him if he or she desires. Id. In summary, through the constitution and case
law, an individual is afforded the protection of not testifying or answering questions related
to the incident, which would incriminate the individual.
104. See Mitchel v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1307 (1999) (holding that the privilege
against self-incrimination is retained at sentencing, at a sentencing hearing, and at a custo-
dial interrogation).
105. 119 S. Ct. 1307 (1999).
106. See Mitdiel, 119 S. Ct. 1307; see also Fifth Amendment-Privilege Against Self-
Incrinination-Applicability at Sentencing Hearings, 113 HI-ARv. L REv. 244, 247 (1999)
(quoting Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951)).
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Court held that an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege is not waived
even though an individual pleads guilty to a crime.'0 7
If an ADHD foundation is not established, the court will not consider a
Fifth Amendment defense of impulsiveness. In Baletine v. State, 08 the
defendant was questioned by authorities regarding a sexual abuse inci-
dent.10 9 During custodial interrogation, the authorities specifically stated
to the defendant that there was a likelihood he would only receive treat-
ment, that charges might not be filed by the parents, and that they were
not interested in prosecuting the case because of the effect it would have
on the seven-year-old." 0 Although the defendant had initially main-
tained his innocence, upon further interrogation the defendant confessed
to intentionally touching the child."' After the defendant's confession,
the detective provided the defendant with the telephone number of a
counselor, who later diagnosed the defendant with ADHD."a2 At the
suppression hearing, the counselor testified that the defendant's behavior
on the videotape was consistent with that of an individual with ADHD." 3
The counselor asserted that due to the stressful situation, the defendant
acted impulsively when he confessed." 4 The state's psychiatric expert
witness provided testimony that the defendant did not suffer from
ADHD, and his confession was reliable." 5 The Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's decision that the defendant did not suffer from
ADHD and found his statement to be voluntary."l 6 However, an infer-
ence can be drawn from the court's ruling that the court was receptive to
evidence presented of an ADHD defense.
Courts evaluate the totality of the circumstances when determining if
an ADHD suspect fully comprehends his Miranda warnings. In Seger-
strom v. State,"7 the Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the conviction
107. See Fifth Amendment-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Applicability at Sen-
tencing Hearings, supra note 106, at 245.
108. 730 So.2d 255 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).
109. See Baletine v. State, 730 So.2d 255, 257 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998). A videotape
confession of the defendant was admitted into evidence. See id. at 257. According to the
defendant's expert witness, a licensed professional counselor, the defendant's behavior on
the videotaped confession was consistent with that of someone who has ADHD. See id. at
258.
110. See id. at 257 (describing the many promises the police made to the defendant in
order to obtain a confession).
111. See id. at 258.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 259.
116. See id.
117. 783 S.W.2d 847 (1990).
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of a fifteen-year-old defendant who murdered a four-year-old child."1
The evidence indicated that the defendant knowingly waived his Miranda
rights prior to confessing. 119 Although he was fifteen years old, the de-
fendant had the mental age of a six-year-old, and suffered from ADD and
had a learning disability, which made it unlikely that he understood his
Miranda warning.120 Expert testimony asserted that an ADHD defen-
dant might understand his Miranda warnings if they were repeated slowly
with a pause after each right. 2' If the defendant had been advised in this
manner, the doctor concluded, he would have understood his rights."z
The testimony of police officers provided evidence that the officer slowly
read each right, explained each right, and asked questions.2 3 In addition,
the state offered evidence that the defendant had been previously ar-
rested. 24 Therefore, after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the
court upheld the conviction.'"
C. ADHD as a Defense-Sua Sponte Request for a Competency
Hearing
If a defendant fails to request a hearing to determine competency, the
court will not provide one sua sponte.' 6 Even if a diminished capacity
defense is implied, the court will not consider a defense that the defen-
dant acted under extreme mental duress, unless the defendant can pro-
vide facts supporting this allegation.' 27
118. See Segerstrom v. State, 783 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Ark. 1990).
119. See id. at 849.
120. See id. at 850.
121. See iU
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. See also People v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 516, 527 (Cal. 1990). During the pen-
alty phase of Kelly, the defense introduced evidence that the defendant suffered from
learning disabilities, including ADD and impulsivity, therefore, his waiver of his Miranda
rights was involuntary. See id. at 528. When reviewing if a statement is voluntary the court
considers the totality of the facts and circumstances. See id. at 527. The court commented
that although this evidence was not presented at the suppression hearing, such evidence,
standing alone, does not establish that the waiver was involuntary. See id. at 528.
126. See Idaho v. Wilhelm, 15 P.3d 824, 828 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) (arguing that the
district court had been provided with evidence to doubt the defendant's competence, be-
cause the defendant was under psychiatric care for manic depression and ADD); see also
BLAcK's LAv DIcroNARY 1437 (7th ed. 1999). Sua sponte is a Latin term meaning, "of
his or its own will or motion." Id. It is also defined as "voluntarily and without prompting
or suggesting." Id.
127. See State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 222 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
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In Missouri v. Clemons,"2 the defendant failed to show that his
ADHD diagnosis would be an issue in his trial; thus, the Missouri Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and denied the defense.1
2 9
The court also concluded that it would not provide funding for a mental
health expert based on unsupported allegations. 130
D. ADHD as a Mental Nonresponsibility Defense
When reviewing a case of a defendant with ADHD, the court can exer-
cise the option of rendering a mental nonresponsibility verdict. A mental
nonresponsibility defense is an affirmative defense that "focuses on the
defendant's culpability in relation to [a] mental disease or defect."' 131 Ac-
cording to 18 U.S.C. § 17(a),
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal stat-
ute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the
offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or de-
fect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrong-
fulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise
constitute a defense.132
Courts have concluded that failure to request or investigate a lack of
mental capacity defense by an attorney is not only grounds for a new
trial, but also "[falls] below the level of competence demanded of attor-
128. 946 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
129. See Clemons, 946 S.W.2d at 221.
130. See id. at 222 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985)). The defense
cited Ake to justify the claim that the defendant met the Ake standard for diminished
capacity. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83. Ake states:
A defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal proceed-
ing... and it is unlikely that psychiatric assistance... would be of probable value in
cases where it is not. The risk of error from denial of such assistance, as well as its
probable value, is most predictably at its height when the defendant's mental condi-
tion is seriously in question.. .[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that
his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must,
at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist. ...
Id. (emphasis omitted). The Clemons court stated that a learning disability defense or an
ADHD defense without supporting evidence was insufficient to be considered a significant
factor in determining the criminal culpability of a defendant with a mental condition. See
id.
131. Wishik, supra note 3, at 116.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988).
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neys."' 33 In Commonwealth v. Roberio,'" the defendant was convicted
of first degree murder and armed robbery.13 The defendant appealed on
grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 136 He alleged
that his attorney failed to pursue a defense based on lack of criminal re-
sponsibility after his parents informed the attorney that he had received
mental treatment for ADHD and traumatic brain injuries.137 The court
also determined that defense counsel erred in failing to seek a psychiatric
evaluation.138 Although the appellate court ruled that a new trial was
unwarranted because the psychologist lacked credibility, the Massachu-
setts Superior Court granted the defendant a new trial, concluding that
the defendant received ineffective assistance as a result of his attorney's
failure to assert a lack of capacity defense. 39
E. Downward Departures Under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines
In 1984, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission to
address concerns such as inconsistent sentencing of criminals in federal
court, abuse by parole boards, and release of criminals after serving only
one-third of their sentence.14° The Commission promulgated federal sen-
tencing guidelines that provided judges with a chart used to determine
the number of years a criminal would serve by considering the nature of
the offense and the criminal record of the accused.' 4 ' While all federal
offenses fall within the sentencing guidelines, about thirty percent of
states have incorporated a similar guideline sentencing system. 4 ' Al-
133. Commonwealth v. Roberio, 700 N.E.2d 830,831 (Mass. 1998); see also, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Doucette, 462 N.E.2d 1084, 1097 (Mass. 1984); Commonwealth v. Saferian,
315 N.E.2d 878,883 (Mass. 1974) (concluding that if counsel believes or raises a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's mental condition, counsel should introduce an insanity
defense).
134. 700 N.E.2d. 830 (Mass. 1998).
135. See Roberio, 700 N.E.2d at 830.
136. See id. at 831.
137. See id. at 831-32 (acknowledging statements the parents disclosed to defense
counsel, that prior to this crime and trial, the defendant obtained mental health treatment).
138. See id. Evidence provided by a clinical psychologist concluded that the defen-
dant suffered from ADHD and other mental disorders. See Id. at 832. The psychologist
further testified that due to the disorder and the fact he was under the influence of alcohol
when the homicide occurred, "he lacked the ability to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law." Id.
139. See id. at 832.
140. Coalition for Federal Sentencing Reform, History of the Guidelines, at http.//
www.sentencing.org/hist.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
141. See id.
142. See id.
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though federal sentencing guidelines are stringent, the Commission has
allowed for downward departures by reducing a criminal's sentence.
The United States Federal Sentencing Commission adopted a down-
ward departure policy for two reasons.143 It did so primarily because of
the difficulty involved in prescribing a single set of guidelines that encom-
pass the wide range of human behavior that could be potentially relevant
in making a sentencing decision."' Under this assumption, the Commis-
sion monitors courts' departure from the sentencing guidelines and their
stated reasons for this departure. 45 This procedure enables the Commis-
sion to identify situations that warrant downward departures. 146 Sec-
ondly, the Commission believes courts will rarely depart from the
guidelines despite having the legal freedom to do so. 147 Federal courts
frequently follow the sentencing guidelines, because they take into ac-
count factors that would significantly impact the pre-guidelines sentenc-
ing practice.'4 8 Although the sentencing guidelines were intended to
assist courts in reducing confusion by providing downward departures,
the confusion has increased because the guidelines do not specify how
cases should be handled. 49 Therefore, it is imperative that the Federal
Sentencing Commission specifically provide for individuals with ADHD
in order to prevent inconsistent decisions by the courts.
Although federal judges have the discretion to reduce a defendant's
sentence, they are reluctant to follow downward departures within the
sentencing guidelines due to inconsistencies in interpretation. 150 Judges
are more likely to follow well-established mitigating factors and circum-
stances specifically allowed under the sentencing guidelines. Further, the
Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has determined that
ADHD is not the "kind of disorder that permits downward depar-
tures." 51 In order to constitute a downward departure, the disorder
would have to diminish the mental capacity of the defendant. 152 Accord-
143. See U.S. SENTENCING GUMELINES MANUAL § 1A, cmt. Background (1998).
144. Id
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Shari L. Kaufman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Formulaic and fin-
personal Approach to Dispensing Justice, 7 NEv. LAWYER 18, 19 (1999).
150. See id. at 19.
151. United States v. Riley, 103 F.3d 145 No. 95-6398, 1996 WL 709935, at *2 (10th
Cir. Dec. 11, 1996). In this case, an adult was charged with conspiracy to manufacture and
distribute Ephedrine and Methamphetamine (Ritalin) and appealed on several grounds
including that the trial court did not take into account his diagnosis of ADHD when ren-
dering his sentence. See id
152. See id.
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ing to the Tenth Circuit, ADHD does not constitute a diminished mental
capacity. 153
If a defense attorney qualifies a juvenile offender under the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act, then the sentencing guidelines are not applica-
ble.154 In United States v. A.R.,'155 an eighteen-year-old juvenile defen-
dant, diagnosed with ADHD, appealed a trial court's decision rendering
him able to stand trial as an adult.' 56 The Sixth Circuit evaluated five
factors when determining how the case should be adjudicated: 1) age and
social background; 2) criminal record; 3) intellectual development and
psychological maturity; 4) past treatment efforts and response to such ef-
forts; and 5) any behavioral intervention programs." While the Court
noted that past treatment efforts had failed, it found that not all enumer-
ated factors needed to be met in order to sustain the trial court's
verdict.'5
Once an individual with AD-D has been convicted of a crime, the
judge may refer to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), which allows a judge to enforce
punishment outside the guidelines if he finds "that there exists an aggra-
vating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not ade-
quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described."'159 The court considers the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission when
determining whether a circumstance was properly factored into the sen-
tencing. 60 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), the court is provided with the au-
thority to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum:
153. See i (affirming Riley's conviction by refusing to allow for downward depar-
tures due to ADHD); see also Maureen P. Coffey, Note, The Genetic Defense: Excuse or
Explanation?, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 353, 380 (1993) (asserting that diminished mental
capacity in delinquents is associated with learning disorders, such as attention deficit disor-
der). However, "studies indicate that many persistent delinquents suffer from neurop-
sychological deficits that may seriously impair their capacities for avoidance learning:
deficits in ability to comprehend and recall cognitive dysfunctions, impaired vision, lack of
ability to sustain levels of concentration and attention, or lack of normal lateralization and
specialization in the cerebral hemispheres." Coffey, supra, at 380. Some "delinquents
have also been shown to have lower IQs than non-delinquents, especially in verbal and
reading performance and frequently exhibit disorders such as ... attention deficit disorders
."Id.
154. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.12, Policy Statement (1998).
155. 203 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2000).
156. See United States v. A.R., 203 F.3d 955, 957-58 (6th Cir. 2000).
157. Id at 960.
158. See id at 961.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
160. See id.
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Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority
to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as mini-
mum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another person who has commit-
ted an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with
the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Com-
mission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code.
161
The policy reasons for departure are stated in section 5K2.0 of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG).1 62 Even though this statute provides
some guidance as to sentencing, it does not thoroughly analyze all possi-
ble exceptions in order to defer discretion to the courts. The judge re-
tains the discretion to determine whether or not the sentence is
inadequate or excessive due to unusual circumstances, even though the
reasons for departure are analyzed. 163
F. ADHD as a Mitigating Factor Due to Diminished Capacity
Another defense for ADHD defendants is diminished capacity. There
are two types of diminished capacity defenses. 164 One type is the partial
or diminished responsibility defense, an affirmative defense requiring the
defendant to provide evidence that he lacked the requisite intent to com-
mit the crime due to a mental defect or disease1 65 Another type is the
strict mens rea or mental state defense, which requires the defendant to
produce evidence to negate an essential element of the case. 1 66 Under
this approach, if the prosecutor is unable to prove the required intent due
to contrary evidence, the defendant will be found not guilty.167 U.S.S.G.
section 5K2.13, allows for downward departure "if the defendant commit-
ted the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental
capacity.' 168
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988).
162. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0, Grounds for Departure
(policy statement) (1998).
163. See id.
164. See Wishik, supra note 3, at 115 (describing the manner in which ADHD can be
used as a diminished capacity defense).
165. See id. In this type of diminished capacity defense, the defendant admits to com-
mitting the crime, but argues that the requisite intent was lacking.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (1998). Under U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.13,
a sentence below the applicable guideline range may be warranted if the defendant
committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity.
However, the court may not depart below the applicable guidelines range if: (1) the
significantly reduced mental capacity was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or in-
[Vol. 4:81
2001] ATTENTION DEFICIT HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER (ADHD) 105
In United States v. Steele, 69 the Eleventh Circuit considered downward
departure due to mental capacity. 70 The Court explained that the Sen-
tencing Commission strongly urged federal district courts to consider the
defendant's mental capacity at the time the offense was committed. 7 1 In
spite of this decision, the trend in federal courts is to "affirm upward de-
partures, reverse downward departures, and affirm the district court's de-
cision not to depart downward."'"
One of the grounds for departure from the federal sentencing guide-
lines is if the individual provides the government with substantial assis-
tance. 73 However, should the government rescind the agreement, the
court will not depart downward based on an ADHiD defense not raised
during trial.1 74 In United States v. Lendt, 75 the defendant was diagnosed
with ADHD, but entered into a plea agreement which allowed the judge
to render a sentence below the statutory minimum because the defendant
provided substantial assistance. 176 However, the government rescinded
this agreement because the outcome was not to its satisfaction and the
defendant was sentenced within the sentencing guidelines.'" Even
though the trial court judge noted that the minimum sentencing was ap-
toxicants; (2) the facts and circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate a need to
protect the public because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of
violence; or (3) the defendant's criminal history indicates a need to incarcerate the
defendant to protect the public. If a departure is warranted, the extent of the depar-
ture should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to the
commission of the offense.
Id. The guidelines further define "significantly reduced mental capacity" to mean "the
defendant, although convicted, has a significant ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness
of the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of the reason; or (B) con-
trol behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful." Id.
169. 178 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 1999).
170. See United States v. Steele, 178 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 1999).
171. See id& at 1240.
172. James T. Skuthan & Rosemary T. Cakmis, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51
MERCBR L. REv. 1189, 1236 (2000).
173. See United States v. Lendt, No. 93-3905, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 31343, at *2 (8th
Cir. Nov. 10, 1994) (per curiam). Under section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, the Government may request a motion for a downward departure based on
substantial assistance. See id. at *1. However, after the defendant presented his testimony,
the government refused to make the motion for downward departure. See id. at *2.
174. See id.
175. No. 93-3905, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 31343 (8th Cir. Nov. 10, 1994).
176. See Lendt, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS at *34. The defendant plead guilty to the
charge of conspiracy to distribute and the charge of possession with intent to distribute
LSD. See id. at *1. Further, his defense counsel did not pursue an ADHD defense. See id.
at *3.
177. See id at *34.
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propriate, an ADHD defense will not be considered if the evidence is not
presented during the trial. 78
An ADHD defendant is more likely to be granted a diminished capac-
ity defense than a nonresponsibility defense.' 79 In a diminished capacity
defense, the court considers ,to what degree the person found guilty of a
criminal act should be held responsible for that act.'8 0 The characteristics
that an ADHD individual exhibits, such as inattentiveness, impulsiveness,
and hyperactivity, lend themselves to a diminished capacity defense., If
the act was sudden and unpremeditated, it negates the element of
intent. s2
Even if courts allow evidence that the defendant has ADHD, the ulti-
mate decision as to whether or not the disorder is causally linked to the
crime rests with the trier of fact. In United States v. Welch, l s3 an unem-
ployed defendant was convicted of threatening to take the life or inflict
bodily harm upon the President of the United States.184 Welch's defense
consisted of testimony by a board certified psychiatrist of Welch's ADD
diagnosis. 8 ' The doctor concluded that although Welch possibly knew
what he was saying, he was unable to fully understand the context of his
words.' 86 Welch was examined by another psychiatrist who confirmed
the previous psychiatrist's diagnosis. 87 The doctor further stated that
due to Welch's substance abuse and lack of medication, he was unable to
form the specific intent for his crime.' 8 8 Although the trial court allowed
evidence of Welch's ADD to be considered by the trier of fact, the jury
convicted him and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.189
Yet, if the issue of ADHD is uncontroverted, the court maintains its
discretion to impose a sentence which does not factor in the defendant's
178. See id. at *24. The court went on to comment that this was an appropriate case
to depart downward because Lendt was only eighteen-years-old when he made the plea
agreement; he had been diagnosed with ADHD, he had no prior criminal conviction, and
he started drinking heavily at age seventeen. See id. at *3. However, the appellate court
was precluded from considering these claims because Lendt did not present them to the
district court. See id.
179. See Wishik, supra note 3, at 117.
180. See id. at 116.
181. See id. at 117.
182. See id.
183. 745 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1984).
184. See United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Wishik, supra
note 3, at 119.
185. See Welch, 745 F.2d at 617; see also Wishik, supra note 3, at 119.
186. See Welch, 745 F.2d at 617; see also Wishik, supra note 3, at 119.
187. See Welch, 745 F.2d at 617; see also Wishik, supra note 3, at 119.
188. See Welch, 745 F.2d at 617; see also Wishik, supra note 3, at 119.
189. See Welch, 745 F.2d at 620; see also Wishik, supra note 3, at 119.
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ADHD diagnosis. In State v. Sommer,'" the defendant was convicted of
aggravated battery.19' After sentencing, the defendant filed a motion to
reconsider his sentence due to his diagnosis of adult attention deficit dis-
order. 92 A psychologist testified that the defendant's crimes were re-
lated to his earlier diagnosis of having an attention deficit disorder and
his conduct in refusing to be transported could be linked to the need for
medication. 93 The trial judge denied the hearing and commented that,
although it was uncontroverted that the defendant had adult attention
deficit disorder, he was still a threat to society.194 The appellate court
affirmed the trial court's ruling, but stated that the importance of recog-
nizing the symptoms of an attention deficit disorder in a defendant who
has not been diagnosed should be reiterated in order to prevent a similar
incident. 95 If it is believed that a defendant suffers from this disorder,
then a pre-trial psychiatric or psychological assessment should be
conducted. 196
VII. PROPOSAL - ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT WITNEss TESTIMONY
BASED UPON THE EDmON TEsr
A. Expert Testimony
One element evident in ADHD defenses is whether or not expert testi-
mony substantiating the defense should be admitted. Expert testimony is
crucial to establishing the foundation for an ADHD defense because it
allows the trier of fact to assess diminished capacity. An evaluation for
ADFHD may be conducted by anyone possessing a medical degree, but
more weight is given to an expert witness with a specialization in this
disorder. 97 As stressed by petitioners in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,198 "recognition of a screening role for the judge that al-
lows for the exclusion of 'invalid' evidence will sanction a stifling and
190. 878 P.2d 1007 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
191. See State v. Sommer, 878 P.2d 1007 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). Initially, the defen-
dant was convicted of aggravated battery and false imprisonment, but subsequently con-
victed as a habitual offender. See id.
192. See id at 1008.
193. See id. The psychologist testified that Sommer's sentencing was greater than the
amount of time needed to treat his ADHD. See id. The expert witness further testified
that ADHD could have contributed to the defendant's refusal to be transported. See id.
194. See id. The defendant appealed on grounds that the trial judge's ruling was bi-
ased due to his failure to appear at the hearing. See id.
195. See id.
196. See Goldstein, supra note 53, at 5.
197. See Wishik, supra note 3, at 123.
198. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also FED. R. Evio. 702. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge wvill assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
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repressive scientific orthodoxy and will be inimical to the search for
truth." 199
Because expert testimony for an ADHD defense is essential to estab-
lishing that the defendant has ADHD, and this disorder is causally con-
nected to the crime, it is important to have a uniform test when
determining the admissibility of expert testimony. The lack of uniformity
in admitting ADHD expert testimony has resulted in inconsistent rulings
by courts and unequal treatment for ADHD defendants. The test should
be composed of criteria that evaluate the causal connection between
ADHD and criminal activity, as well as the defendant's inability to form
the requisite intent required for the crime.
B. Applying State v. Edmon
In State v. Edmon,200 the Washington Court of Appeals reviewed the
trial court's denial of admitting psychiatric expert testimony relating to
the defendant's diminished capacity when he shot his supervisor.20' At
the time of the incident, Edmon had a blood alcohol content of 0.13 per-
cent and little sleep.2" The psychiatric testimony presented at trial in-
cluded evidence that the defendant also suffered from anxiety and
depression, both "medically recognized mental disorders." 20 3 Due to
these circumstances, the psychiatrist concluded Edmon would most likely
be unable to form the requisite intent for this crime.20 4
The Edmon Court, using a hybrid of court rulings, introduced and ap-
plied a nine-step foundational requirement for expert testimony in a di-
minished capacity defense.20 5 Prior to admitting expert testimony
substantiating a diminished capacity defense, the Edmon court held that
the following requirements must be satisfied by the proponent "to ensure
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
199. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
200. 621 P.2d 1310 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
201. See State v. Edmon, 621 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
202. See id. Edmon further stated that he did not recall the incident and rather than
contest the shooting, he offered the psychiatric testimony as evidence supporting his de-
fense. See id.
203. Id. Edmon presented evidence at trial in the form of a hypothetical situation.
See id. "The hypothetical included the defendant's background, his mental disorders, the
difficulties with his supervisors, and the other circumstances surrounding the shooting." Id.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 1313; see also State v. Martin, 538 P.2d 873 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975), State
v. Craig, 514 P.2d 151 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Carter, 490 P.2d 1346 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1971); State v. Moore, 377 P.2d 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 1963).
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the competency, materiality, and relevancy of the testimony." 2°  First,
defense counsel must establish that the defendant "lacked the ability to
form the specific intent due to a mental disorder not amounting to in-
sanity."'2 7 Second, the expert must be "qualified to testify on the sub-
ject."2 "8 Third, the expert must be able to examine and diagnose the
defendant and be able to "testify to an opinion with reasonable medical
certainty."2" 9 Fourth, the expert's testimony must be based on "substan-
tial supporting evidence in the record relating to the defendant and the
case, or there must be an offer to prove such evidence. The supporting
evidence must accurately reflect the record and cannot consist solely of
uncertain estimates or speculation." 10 The fifth factor requires that
"[t]he cause of the inability to form a specific intent must be a mental
disorder, not emotions like jealousy, fear, anger, and hatred." 2" The
next factor for consideration is that "[tithe mental disorder must be caus-
ally connected to a lack of specific intent, not just reduced perception,
overreaction or other irrelevant mental states. ',21  The seventh factor ne-
cessitates that the defendant exhibit "[tihe inability to form a specific in-
tent... at a time relevant to the offense. '213 Next, "[tihe mental disorder
must substantially reduce the probability that the defendant formed the
alleged intent. '214 Lastly, "[tihe lack of specific intent may not be in-
ferred from evidence of the mental disorder, and it is insufficient to only
give conclusory testimony that a mental disorder caused an inability to
form specific intent. The opinion must contain an explanation of how the
mental disorder had this effect., 2 15 In applying these rules to the facts of
the case at bar, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed on grounds
206. State v. Spring, No. 96-8-01926-9, 1998 WL 40061, at *12 (Wash. Ct. App., Feb. 2
1998).
207. Ednon, 621 P.2d at 1313; see generally Martin, 538 P.2d 873; State v. Ferrick, 506
P.2d 860 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973). Although this test applied to specific intent crimes only, it
is now also applied to general intent crimes.
208. Edion, 621 P.2d at 1313; see generally Martin, 538 P.2d 873.
209. Edmon, 621 P.2d at 1313; see generally Martin, 538 P.2d 873.
210. Ednzon, 621 P.2d at 1313.
211. Edmon, 621 P.2d at 1313; see generally State v. Upton, 556 P.2d 239 (Wash. Ci.
App. 1976); State v. Moore, 377 P.2d 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 1963); State v. Cogswell, 339
P.2d 465 (Wash. Ct. App. 1959).
212. Edmon, 621 P.2d at 1313; see generally Martin, 538 P.2d 873.
213. Edmon, 621 P.2d at 1313; see generally State v. Craig, 514 P.2d 151 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1973).
214. Edmion, 621 P.2d at 1313; see generally State v. White, 374 P2d 942 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1962); State v. Carter, 490 P.2d 1346 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
215. Ednzon, 621 P.2d at 1313-14; see generally State v. Ferrick, 506 P.2d 860 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1973).
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that the testimony had met the requirements of the nine-step test, and the
exclusion of expert testimony denied the defendant a fair trial."1 6
The nine-step foundational requirement has been applied in cases in-
volving ADHD defendants. In State of Washington v. D.J.P.,t7 a thir-
teen-year-old (D.J.P.) was arrested and charged with intent to do bodily
harm. 18 This incident resulted in bums over fifteen percent of the vic-
tim's body.219 D.J.P.'s attorney introduced a diminished capacity de-
fense.220 In support of this defense, the attorney presented evidence
from a clinical child psychologist who testified that D.J.P. exhibited mod-
erate signs of ADHD, which would not allow D.J.P. the ability to formu-
late intent.22' To rebut this testimony, the state presented the testimony
of a licensed psychologist.222 Whenever expert testimony reasonably sup-
ports the defense and proves that a mental disorder, other than insanity,
played a part in the defendant's ability to formulate the mental culpabil-
ity for the crime charged, the expert's testimony should be admissible.
22 3
The appellate court applied the Edmon test when determining whether
the expert testimony of the clinical child psychologist should be admissi-
ble. 24 The evidence was excluded due to lack of foundation, and D.J.P.
216. See Edmon, 621 P.2d at 1313-14. The Court found that offer of proof was suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements and prevented the defendant from forming the intent to
injure. See id. at 1314.
217. No. 41459-3-I, 1999 LEXIS 128, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 1999) (not desig-
nated for publication).
218. See State v. D.J.P., No. 41459-3-I, 1999 LEXIS 128, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 25,
1999) (not designated for publication). Witnesses testified that D.J.P. and his friends made
several attempts to burn the victim. See id. First, they flicked lighted matches at the vic-
tim's head. See id. Then, D.J.P. lit an entire book of matches and placed them under the
victim's jacket. See id. Finally, they moved the lighted paper closer to the victim until it
was directly under his coat. See id. They watched the nylon coat melt and ignite in a
matter of 20 seconds. See id. Witnesses also claimed the boys were "jumping up and down,
giggling." Id.
219. See id at *2. The victim was hospitalized for about thirty-seven days, had two
operations, and required a third operation. See id.
220. See id. at *3 (arguing that the defendant did not act intentionally, but recklessly
because he "had no idea that the jacket would burst into flames as it did and severely burn
[the victim]").
221. See id. at *2. Dr. Wood tested DJ.P. for four to five hours and also interviewed
family members and reviewed D.J.P,'s records. See id. She concluded that his symptoms
included "inability to sustain attention, being easily distracted, making mistakes, frequently
losing things, having difficulty concentrating on school work." Id.
222. See id. at *3. The State's expert witness, a licensed psychologist, agreed with Dr.
Wood's analysis that D.J.P. exhibited moderate signs of ADHD. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id. at *12 (describing the process of factors that need to be satisfied for expert
testimony to be admitted).
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was found guilty of first degree assault 2 The case is important because,
even though the Edmon test was not met in this case, its application to an
AD-D defense is a milestone in the development of a single test to de-
termine the admissibility of expert testimony. On appeal, the conviction
was upheld because the clinical child psychologist's testimony had not
met the last criteria of explaining how D.J.P.'s disorder inhibited his abil-
ity to form the required intent. 26 Accordingly, a clear explanation as to
how the mental disorder and the ability to formulate intent are causally
connected is essential to substantiate a different ruling.2 7
If ADHD can be proven to be a mitigating factor, a crime with the
mens rea of intent or knowledge can be lessened to recklessness.,' In
State v. Spring,2 9 the Washington Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded a decision by a juvenile court, which had not considered the de-
fendant's AD-ID diagnosis and its effect on his ability to form intent?30
Spring was convicted of first degree arson after he set fire to his sister's
bed over a dispute. 3 1 A clinical psychologist testified that the defendant
suffered from ADHD and explained the causal connection between the
diagnosis and his mental capacity?3 2 The psychologist further testified
that although Spring was capable of recognizing that he was lighting a
match, the evidence was inconclusive that Spring'knowingly caused the
fire 233 thus, the defendant lacked the element of knowledge. After the
appellate court determined that the expert testimony met the require-
ments of the Edmon test, it ruled the testimony admissible.2a Once the
trial court admits the evidence, the burden to present evidence establish-
225. See id. at *11.
226. See id. at *10.
227. See id. at *34; Criminal Responsibility, 23 MFNTrAL & PHYSICAL DISADiIUTY L
REP. 184, 187 (1999).
228. See Goldstein, supra note 53, at 6.
229. No. 39795-8-I, 1998 LEXIS 147, at *24 (Wash. Ct. App. Div.1 Feb. 2, 1998).
230. See State v. Spring, No. 39795-8-I, 1998 LEXIS 147, at *24 (Wash. Ct. App. Div.1
Feb. 2, 1998).
231. See id. According to studies, those diagnosed with ADHD have a higher likeli-
hood of antisocial behavior such as stealing and fire setting. See Foley et al., supra note 11,
at 334.
232. See Spring, 1998 LEXIS at *10-13. The State of Washington applies the dimin-
ished capacity defense in a manner in which it is "essentially a rule of evidence, not an
affirmative defense." Id. "Expert testimony supporting a diminished capacity defense is
admissible whenever it logically and by reasonable inference tends to prove that a mental
disorder, not amounting to insanity, impaired the defendant's ability to form the required
level of mental culpability for the crime charged." Id.
233. See id. at *13.
234. See UL at *14-15.
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ing that the defendant's criminal behavior is not an isolated incident rests
on the defense. 3 5
VIII. CONCLUSION
The inability to control one's actions, the lack of social inhibition, and
the hyperactivity associated with ADHD should be factors assessed by an
expert witness in determining the extent to which the disorder was caus-
ally connected to the crime. ADHD has been known to man for over a
century and currently affects millions of adults. The affects of this disor-
der overlap from childhood into adulthood. Research indicates that not
only does ADHD play a major role during childhood, but in adulthood
the disorder also affects the person's workplace and personal life.
For quite some time, ADHD has been afforded federal protection
through Acts such as: the IDEA, interpreting "other health impair-
ments" to include ADHD children; the ADA, interpreting "major life
activity" to include individuals with ADHD; and the Rehabilitation Act,
specifying Section 504 as a protection afforded to individuals with
ADHD.
Even though the federal disability Acts attempt to shield ADHD indi-
viduals from discrimination, such progress has not been made in the crim-
inal justice system. Individuals with ADHD should be protected at each
stage of their lives, especially when they are being accused of a crime.
Thus, a thorough analysis of the defendant's mental competency is essen-
tial. Before this disorder can be recognized as a defense to criminal be-
havior, however, either the defendant or the court must be permitted to
request a competency hearing to review data presented by an expert
witness.
Although this proposal is only a small effort to remedy a problem that
has existed for decades, for many individuals with ADHD who have
found themselves in the confines of the criminal justice system, it is a
significant step toward justice.
235. See Wishik, supra note 3, at 106.
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